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ON THE ENGLISH ANAPHORIC 
EXPRESSION ANOTHER 
Beom-mo Kang 
In this paper, I try to draw attention to many patterns which anaphors in the 
usual sense (pronouns) and another N share. Both can be used as bound variables 
and the syntactic configurations govern the possibility of binding in the same way. 
However, unlike pronouns, another N has lexical content and shows scope 
ambiguity. These observations lead us to recognize two kinds of indices --
anaphoric and categorial. The idea is implemented in a categorial theory of 
binding, which assumes transparent model-theoretic interpretation. Finally, it is 
suggested that some remaining problems for the binding of another N in donkey 
sentences be treated on the discourse level, as in the case of pronouns. 
o. INTRODUCTION 
Among many context dependent expressions in natural language, anaphoric 
expressions such as reflex ives, reciprocals, and pronouns show referential 
dependencies within or outside of a sentence. Binding theory is concerned with 
these kinds of dependencies. But we sometimes notice that context depen-
dencies in a totally different area show a pattern very similar to the referential 
dependencies of anaphors. For example, Partee (1983) reveals a strikingly 
similar pattern between English past tense and pronouns (deictic use, use as 
bound variable, etc.). In this paper, I wish to draw attention to the fact that the 
pattern of "another" as in another person is very similar to that of pronouns, 
and to suggest a way to accommodate this in a binding theory.l For concrete 
implementation, I will extend the Categorial theory of binding proposed by 
Bach and Partee (1980), Chierchia (to appear), and Chierchia and Jacobson 
(1985). 
1. ANOTHER (PERSON) AND PRONOUNS 
There are many similarities between pronouns and another (person).2 Before 
1 Partee (1986) discussed many context dependent expressions in language, such as local, 
enemy, foreigner, arrive, opposite, and unfamiliar. She tried to argue for a "broader theory of 
context dependent elements in which pronouns occupy one extreme position on a contin· 
uum." Although She did not mention another in that talk, it should be in the scope of the 
data. Here, I concentrate more on syntactic constraints and try to give a possible treatment 
with indexing. 
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I enumerate these similarities, a word on notation is in order. For example, 
(1) John, likes another person,. 
(1) means that John likes a person x such that x "* John. That is, another 
means "another" with respect to John, and I use coindexing to express this 
anaphoric dependency. 
The similarities between pronouns and another (person) are as follows: 
First, like pronouns, another (person) can be used as if it were a bound 
variable (or as if it had a bound variable in its meaning). 
(2) a. Every man, thinks that hei is happy. 
b. Every man, thinks that another person, is happy. 
As (2a) can mean that for each man x, x thinks that x is happy, (2b) can mean 
that for each man x, there i~ a person y such that y "* x and x thinks that y 
is happy.s The value of another person varies for each man, which is exactly 
the behavior of bound variables. 
Second, like pronouns, another (person) shows the weak crossover (WeO) 
and strong crossover (SeO) effect. 
(3) a. *His, mother likes no man,. 
b. • Another person, 's mother likes no man,. 
(3a) cannot mean that there is no man x such that x's mother likes x .. the 
weo effect. Similarly, (3b) cannot mean that there is no man x such that there 
is a person y such that y "* x and y's mother likes x. Notice also the similar 
acceptability of the following sentences. 
(4) a. No man,'s mother hates him,. 
b. No man,'s mother likes another person, (better than him,). 
Another example is the following. 
(5) a. *He, likes every man,. 
b. * Another person, likes every man,. 
(5a) cannot mean that for each man x, x likes x (which can be experssed by 
Every man likes himself) .. the seo effect. Similarly, (5b) cannot mean that for 
each man x, there is a person y such that y "* x and y likes x (which is 
expressed by Every man is liked by another person). Since I am only treating 
Quantifier cases, what I mean by seo is a special case of weo if weo is 
2 Another seems to have two different (but related) senses: 1) roughly "a different" or 
"other than oneself", and 2) roughly "one more" as in John has a servant and he wants 
another (one). This paper concerns only with the first use ("different") of another. I will leave 
it open whether the two senses should be reduced to one. 
S For the time being, let us ignore the ambiguity due to the opaque context created by 
think. 
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treated in terms of "leftness" (Jacobson 1979). Here, I am using the term seo 
in the sense that the pronoun c-comrnands the Quantifier and the Quantifier 
does not c-command the pronoun. 
Third, like pronouns, another (person) cannot be bound to a quantified NP 
which is not higher, i.e. a c-commanding NP or a later argument in function-
argument structure. (But notice the exceptional case of (4) above.) 
(6) a. • A woman who knows no manl hates himl. 
b. • A woman who knows no manl hates another personl. 
(6a) cannot mean that there is no man x such that a woman who k~ows x hates 
x. Similarly, (6b) cannot mean that there is no man x such that there is a 
person y such that y =1= x and a woman who knows x hates y. 
Fourth, like pronouns, another (person) can be bound to a discourse referent. 
(7) a. I like Johnl. Mary likes him!> too. 
b. I like Johnl. Mary likes another personl. 
The second sentence in (7b) means that there is a person x such that x =1= John 
and Mary likes x. 
Finally, like pronouns, another (person) can be used in "donkey" sentences 
(Geach 1962). 
(8) a. If a farmer owns a donkeYh he beats itl . 
b. If a man knows a personl, he likes another personl. 
(9) a. Every farmer who owns a donkeYl beats itl. 
b. Every man who knows a personl likes another personl. 
(8a) means that for each man x and donkey y, if x owns y, then x beats y. 
Similarly, (8b) means that for each man x and person y, if x knows y, then 
there is a person z such that z =1= y and x likes z. (9) is a similar case. (For some 
differences, see section 4.) 
Thus far, I have shown that the behavior of another (person) is similar to 
that of singular pronouns. It also has properties similar to the plural pronoun 
they in that it can have split antecedents. 
(10) a. Every manl and MarY2 think that theYl.2 are happy. 
b. Every manl and MarY2 think that another personl.2 is happy. 
(lOa) can mean that for each man x, x and Mary think that x and Mary are 
happy. Similarly, (lOb) can mean that for each man x, x and Mary think that 
there is a person y such that y =1= x, Y =1= Mary, and y is happy (in addition to 
the readings where another person is anaphorically related with only one of 
every man and Mary). 
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2. A BINDING THEORY FOR ANOTHER (PERSON) 
The above observations indicate that another (person) should be treated like 
pronouns in binding theory (in that sense that it is the theory for pronouns). In 
this section, I will try to accommodate another (person) in a syntactic theory 
of binding. I will not treat the usage in discourse as in "donkey" sentences. 
In a sense, when we consider the meaning of another person as 'some person 
other than him/her', the above observations may not be surprising, as 
pointed out by Barry Schein (p.c.). So, one might be tempted to use the meaning 
of another person directly in grammar, so that all the behavior of another 
person might reduce to the behavior of pronouns. But in the current interpre-
tive frameworks (GB or any other current theories), we certainly cannot have 
some person other than him / her at any syntactic level to derive another person 
on the surface. Rather, the way to incorporate another in binding theory is to 
extend the notion that binding theory is a theory for referential dependency 
rather than a theory for coreference (and noncoreference), as explicitly 
advocated by Reinhart (1983), among others'. In this view, coindexing does not 
mean "the same referent" but only means the referential dependency in inter-
pretation. I propose that we should represent anaphoric dependencies by 
coindexing in syntax, and that this "anaphoric dependency" should be inter-
preted not only as referential dependency for bound pronouns like those in 
(Za) - (lOa), but also as "disjoint dependency" for another (person) in (Zb) - (lOb). 
Under this proposal, the only difference between pronouns and another (per-
son) is the way they are actually interpreted, even though both are bound (by 
coindexing) in the same sense. Any account for constraints on binding for 
pronouns (such as cross-over) will automatically serve for the cases of another 
(person). 
As a matter of fact, the notion of "disjoint dependency" was already 
introduced by Saxon (1984) and Roberts (1987). Saxon introduced the term 
"disjoint anaphor" for an anaphor in Dogrib (an Indian language in Canada) 
which should be bound in the governing category but which should be interpret-
ed disjointly from the antecedent. Yet another person contrasts with the 
disjoint anaphor in Dogrib in many respects. Particularly, it cannot be just a 
pronoun in the usual sense, as will be seen subsequently, while the disjoint 
anaphor in Dogrib is more like a pronoun. 
Another (person) is different from pronouns in certain important respects. 
Unlike pronouns, another (person) or more generally another N has its lexical 
, Fanner (1987) presents data that show problems if one assumes that indices express the 
relation of coreference. disjoint reference, and overlapping reference. Fanner concludes that 
the above relations should be determined by the lexical meaning of pronouns (l, we, you, he 
they, ... ). This conclusion is consistent with my view on another (person) here. 
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content-another person, another man another girl, etc. Also it introduces the 
existential quantifier in interpretation. For example, 
(11) J ohnl thinks that Mary likes another personl. 
(11) can be interpreted roughly as (12). 
(12) a. 3 x [person'(x) & x =1= j & think'(j, like'(m, x))] 
b. think'(j, 3 x [person'(x) & x=l=j & like'(m, x)]) 
This shows that we ultimately will have to deal with the scope phenomena by 
adopting certain methods such as Quantifier Raising (May 1985) or Storage 
(Cooper 1983). Also, it can be shown that the lexical content ot' another N 
affects the possibilities of binding. 
(13) Johnl thinks that Mary2 likes another girl2' * I. 
(14) Every bachelorl thinks that a girl2 likes another manl> * 2. 
As can be seen in the above examples, another N should be "another" with 
respect to an individual which is a member of the set denoted by N. 
The above observations reveal that another N has properties of full NP's, 
too. My suggestion is that the appropriate way to handle another N should be 
to separate the notion of "anaphoric index" from that of "categorial index". 
The anaphoric index is the one showing anaphoric dependencies (for pronouns 
and for another N) and the categorial index is the one which the NP's 
(Generalized Quantifiers) inherently have. That is, if we allow QR, the latter is 
the index which the trace left behind by the Quantifier will have. In other 
words, what I suggest is to separate A-binding and A-binding as viewed in 
Chomsky (1981) and Higginbotham (1983), but, unlike Chomsky and others, to 
allow the two kinds of binding to be represented at the same time. For 
pronouns, the distinction does not matter because pronouns do not show the 
scope ambiguity and do not have much lexical content. We may think that the 
anaphoric index and the categorial index of pronouns are the same. (Or, we 
may think that pronouns have only the anaphoric index.) But for another N it 
certainly does make a difference. 
3. A CATEGORIAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Now I will show how the idea presented above (i.e. the idea that the 
anaphoric index and the categorial index can be separated) may be implement-
ed in a categorial theory of binding suggested by Chierchia (to appear) and 
Chierchia and Jacobson (1985), among others. 
This theory combines the technique of Cooper storage (which corresponds to 
Quantifier Raising in the GB literature) and feature passing mechanisms of 
GPSG (Gazdar et al. 1985). Originally, storage was designed strictly as an 
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interpretive mechanism to handle the scope ambiguity of quantified NP's, as in 
(15), without using Quantifying-in syntactically, as in Montague (1974). 
(15) Every man loves a woman. 
But in Chierchia and Jacobson's framework, storage is not a purely interpre-
tive device. When a quantifier has been stored and needs to be assigned scope, 
this fact is also recorded in the syntax via a feature called ST(ore), which has 
a set of indices as its value. For example, one reading of (15) is analyzed as in 
(16). 
(16) 
~ : store-out NP2 
S[ST: {2}] : store-out NPl 
I 
~ 
NPl [ST: {I}] VP[ST: {2}] 
I ~ 
NPl V NP2 [ST: {2}] 
~ I I 
every man loves NPz 
~ 
a woman 
meaning: ::J x [woman'(x) & Vy[man'(y)---->love'(y) (x)]] 
In (16), among the stored quantified NP's, NPl is interpreted before NP2 , giving 
the narrow scope reading to every man and the wide scope reading to a 
woman. The feature ST is passed by something like the Foot Feature Principle 
(FFP) of GPSG. Basically, to interpret the sentence with pronouns as in (I'n, 
(I'n Every manl thinks that he l is a genius. 
quantified NP (every man) is stored-in, and later when it is stored-out it binds 
both the position it originates from and the pronoun it is coindexed with. 
Another syntactic feature used for binding is LPS, representing "local pronoun 
store". This feature, which originates from Bach and Partee (1980), also has a 
set of indices as its value and the purpose of it is to capture the locality effect 
(Principle A and Principle B) in English. 
A lexical item is a six·tuple represented as in (I8), and (19) lists some examples. 
(18) (expression, category (with categorial index), IL·translation, stored 
meaning, ST, LPS) 
(19) a. <he, NP[4], x4 , 0, ST: 0, LPS: 0> 
b. <every man, NP[2], X2, <.-1P[Vx[man'(x)-P(x)]], 2>, ST: {2}, 
LPS: 0> 
c. <himself, NP[7refl], X7, 0, ST: [7refl], LPS:0> 
And the core rule will be conditioned as in (20) to regulate feature passing. 
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CO) A/B + B = > A Def : CI(A) = the categorial index of A 
ST(A) = the value of ST on A 
LPS(A) = the value of LPS on A 
o 1 2 
Conditions; 
i ) LPS(2) = LPS(O) U CI(l) [opacity] 
ii) LPS(O) n CI(l) = ° [Principle B effect] 
iii} ST(2) = ST(O) U ST(l) [feature passing] 
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Technical details aside, ST is the feature which passes the binding possibilities 
through tree structure and LPS is the feature which assigns local domain for 
reflexives and pronouns. 
In addition to these mechanisms including the categorial index, I add the 
feature "anaphoric index". For pronouns, the anaphoric index and the categor-
ial index should be the same, as mentioned eariler. But for another N they can 
be different. For example, another person in Cl) has the categorial information 
of C2). 
(21) Every bOYa likes another persona. 
(22) <another person, NP[9, 3], AP3y[y=t:xa & person'(y) & P(y)] , 0, ST: 0, 
LPS:0> 
The derivation of (21) is demonstrated in (23). 
(23) (LPS is ignored here) 
< every boy likes another person, S, 
Vx[boy'(x)~like'(AP3y[person'(y)&y=t:x&P(y)])(x)], 0, ST: D> 
I Store-out NP[3] 
< every boy likes another person, 
S, like'(AP:3 y[person'(y)&y=t:xa &P(y)])(xa), 
<A PVx[boy'(x)~P(x), 3>], ST: 3> 
<every boy, NP[3], Xa, <A PVx[boy'(x)~P(x)], 3>, ST: { 
<likes a.p., like'(A P3y[person'(y)&y=t:xa &P(y)]), D, ST: D> 
<likes, V, like', D, S~ 
<another person, NP[9, 3], AP3y[person'(y)&y=t:xa&P(y)], 0, ST: O> 
Since like' is an extensional verb, (24a) is related to (24b) by a meaning 
postulate and we finally get the meaning of (25) for (23). 
(24) a. like'(AP:3y[person'(y) & y=t:x P(y)])(x) 
b. 3y[person'(y) & y=t:x & like'.(x, y)] 
(25) V x [boy'(x)~ :3 y [person'(y) & y * x & like' .(x, y)] 
The same result will be obtained if we store another person and store it out 
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before every hoy. 
Let us try a more complex example of (11) (repeated below). 
(11) John3 thinks that Mary2 likes another person3. 
Reading 1: think'(j, 3 x [person'(x) & x=l=j & like'.(m, x)]) 
Reading 2: 3 x [person'(x) & x=l=j & think'O, like'.(m, x»] 
These two readings are derived as followss. 
(26) Reading 1 : 
< ... , think'(j, 3 y[person'(y) & y=l= j & like'.(m, y)]), ... > 
I Store-out 3 
<John thinks that Mary likes another person, S, 
think'(3y[person'(y) & y=l=X3 & like'.(m, y)])(X3), <tl PP(j),.3>, ST: {3} 
~~---------­
<John, NP[3], Xa, <tl PPG>,3>, ST: {3} ~ 
< think that Mary likes another person, VP, 
think'(3y[person'(y) & y=l=Xa & like' * (m, y)]) ... > 
<think, V, thi~ 
< Mary likes another person, S 
Iike'(tl P 3 y[person'(y)&y =1= X3 &P(y)])(m), .. , > 
<Mary, NP[2], m,.0, ST:.0~ 
< likes another person, VP, like'(A P3 y[person'(y)&y=l=X3&P(y)]),.0, ST:.0> 
<likes, V, like', 0~:~ 
<another person, NP[9, 3J, tl P3y[person'(y)&y=l=x3 &P(y)J,.0, ST:.0> 
Here, I wish to add some comments on the translation of another N which 
is bound to an antecedent. Unlike pronouns, another N can be bound only to 
an antecedent which is in the set denoted by N, as mentioned before. A wrong 
way to accommodate this condition would be to use a translation like: 
tl P3y[person'(y) & person'(x3) & y=l=xa & P(y)], which will give the wrong 
interpretation. For example, (11) will mean that John thinks that there is a 
person x such that x is not John and John is a person and Mary likes x: think' 
5 The following derivation draws heavily on the scope theory of the de re / de dicto 
ambiguity with respect to opaque contexts. It may be controversial whether it is the best 
way to treat the ambiguity in opaque contexts. However, there is an example which shows 
my point clearly without recourse to the scope theory. 
John, thinks that every woman. likes another person,. 
a. think'(j, '<;ix[woman'(x)-+3y[y*i & person'(y) & like'.(x,y)]]) 
b. think'(j, 3y[y*i & person'(y) & '<;ix[woman'(x)-+ like'.(x,y)]]) 
These two readings are due to the scope ambiguity within a clause, which seems 
uncontroversial (Every man loves a woman). 
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C1) Reading 2 : 
< ... , 3y[person'(y) & y=l=j & think'G, like'.(m,y))], ... > 
I Store-out 3 
< ... , 3 y[person'(y)&y =1= xa&think'(xs, like'.(m, y»], ... ST: {3}> 
I Store-out 9 
<John thinks that Mary likes another person, S, 
think'(like' • (m,xg~ : {9, 3} > 
<John, NP[3], Xa, <APPG),3>, S~ 
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< think that Mary likes another person, VP, think'(like' • (m,xg» ... > 
<think, V, thi~ 
< Mary likes another person, S, like' .(m,xg), ... > 
<Mary, NP[2], m, f:l'~ 
< likes a.p., VP, like'(x9 *), < A P 3 y[person'(y)&y=l= Xa&P(y))), 3 >, ST: {9} > 
<likes, V, like', f:l~ 
<another person, NP[9,3], Xa*, <A P3y[})erson'(y)&y4=Xa&P(Y),9>, ST:{9}> 
G, 3y[person'(y) & person'G) & y=l=j & like'.(m,y)]). Certainly, (11) dose not 
mean this since (11) does not express John's belief that "John is a person". What 
is really going on is that the antecedent is presupposed to be a person in this 
case. Therefore, the requirement that another N should be bound to an 
antecedent which is a member of N is really a presupposition6 • 
6 Here, what is presupposed is that the antecedent should be (Semantically) a member of 
the set denoted by N in another N. Thus, it is a restriction on coindexing. Postal talked 
about "presupposed coreference" between co indexed pronouns and their antecedents. For 
example, in a theory that coindexing should mean coreference, a sentence like He is John 
should be problematic for binding theory. Usually, a pronoun cannot have an antecedent 
which it c·commands (* He. likes John.), but in the above case, he and John should be the 
same person. Postal noticed that the coreference in He is John is "stated", not 
"presupposed", and claimed that binding theory should be concerned with presupposed 
coreference. In the theory adopted in this paper, "presupposed coreference" for pronouns is 
a special case of referential dependency. In other words, Postal's presupposition can be 
regarded as a condition on the interpretation of the coindexed pronouns, and the presupposi-
tion I am talking about with respect to another person is the condition on coindexing, just 
as the pronoun he should be bound to a male individual. 
Since coreference is independent from indexation to a certain degree the following 
situation can arise (an example pointed out by an anonymous LR referee) : John told Jane 
that Mary likes Bob. But Jane told John that Mary likes another boy, namely John. In this 
case, the referent of another boy can be John. In other words, the index of another boy should 
be that of Bob (discourse binding). 
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Until now, I have treated the cases where the anaphoric index of another N 
is a singleton set. In cases where another N has the anaphoric index which is 
more than a singleton set, a slight change of translation is enough.. For 
example, 
(28) Every bOYl told 10hn2 that Mary likes another bOYl,2' 
in (28), another boy will be represented as follows. 
(29) <another boy, NP[8,{1,2}], AP3y[boy'(y) & y=t=Xl & y=t=X2 & P(y)], 
£I, ST: £I, LPS: £I> 
Eventually, we will get the reading of (30) for (28). 
(30) Vx[boy'(x)---+tell'(x, j, 3y[boy'(y) & y=t=x & y=t=j & like'.(m,y)])] 
The present analysis will be straightforwardly extended to other N's such as 
other persons, other boys, other girls, etc. For example, 
(31) Every bOYl likes other personSl. 
(31) means that for each boy x, x likes a sufficiently large number of people who 
are not x. Technically, other persons in (31) could be treated as follows7 •. 
(32) <other persons, NP[7,1], A P3Y[Xl~ Y & person'(Y) & P(Y) & 
I Y I > n] , ... >, where Y is a plural variable and n is a sufficiently large 
number which is to be determined contextually. 
(31) will be given the following interpretation. 
(33) Vx[boy'(x)---+3Y[x~ Y & person'(Y) & like'.(Y)(x) & IYI >n] 
4. DISCOURSE 
The categorial analysis presented above have not been concerned with the 
cases of "donkey" sentences. In fact, current syntactic treatments of pronouns, 
whether GB or Categorial Grammar, do not have much to say about pronouns 
in "donkey" sentences. In "donkey" sentences, the c-command (or f-command) 
condition for bound variables is violated and an indefinite NP gets a universal 
interpretation. The Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) proposed by 
Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982) handles theses problems in an interesting way by 
an unconventional treatment of conditionals and indefinites. The DRT treats 
all kinds of pronouns in the same fashion through the notion of "discourse 
referent" (Karttunen 1976). 
Let us take a typical "donkey sentence". 
7 Following Hoeksema (1983), I assume that every verb has plural objects in its argument 
domain. 
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(34) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. 
In the Kamp-style box notation, (34) will be represented by the following 
discourse representation structure (DRS)_ 
(35) 
mO I If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it. 
ml x y 
farmer (x) 
donkey (y) 
x owns y 
==> x beats y m2EJ 
The assumed embedding condition for conditionals gives the effect of un-
selective binding by the universal quantifier and gives the correct interpreta-
tion: for each farmer-donkey pair (x, y> such that x owns y, x beats y_ 
The another N in "donkey" sentences may be treated in a similar way_ 
(36) If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats another donkey_ 
Here is an approximate DRS for (36) : 
(3'n 
mO I If a farmer owns a donkey, he beats another donkey_ 
ml x y 
farmer (x) 
donkey (y) 




x beats z 
From the above, we can conclude that another N in donkey sentences can 
be treated in a certain way as pronouns in donkey sentences in the DRT. That 
is, discourse binding is going on in both cases. The natural question which 
arises is: How far should the discourse binding go? For pronouns, the DRT 
claims that all the uses of pronouns should be treated in the same fashion. But 
more syntactically oriented theories such as Categorial Gammar and GB will 
separate the pronouns in donkey sentences from other uses of pronouns. As for 
another N, we may either follow the analysis of the DRT to treat all the cases 
in the same fashion. Or, we may keep the syntactic analysis given in the 
previous sections as it is, and treat only donkey sentences as a case of 
discourse phenomena. I have no definite opinion on this issue, which can be 
rephrased as: Where should one draw the line between syntax and discourse? 
What I belive is that it would be ad hoc to distinguish syntactically bound 
pronouns from discourse bound pronouns, and at the same time to treat all the 
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uses of another N as discourse phenomena. As I showed earlier, their behavior 
is very similar. If syntactically bound pronouns should be recognized, the 
syntactically bound another N should be recognized, too8 • 
5. SUMMARY 
In this paper, I have tried to draw attention to many patterns which are 
common to anaphors in the usual sense (pronouns) and another N. They both 
can be used as bound variables, and the syntactic configurations govern the 
possibility of binding in the same way. However, unlike pronouns, another N 
has lexical content and shows scope ambiguity. These observations have led us 
to recognize two kinds of indices - anaphoric and categorial. This basic idea 
was implemented in a categorial theory of binding, which assumes transparent 
model-theoretic interpretation. Finally, just like pronouns, some remaining 
problems for the binding of another N in donkey sentences were suggested to 
be treated on the discourse level. 
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